Murray State's Digital Commons
Faculty & Staff Research and Creative Activity
Spring 4-3-2020

Willingness to Protest over Resource Extraction in Latin America
Moises Arce
Tulane University, marce@tulane.edu

Marc S. Polizzi
Murray State University, mpolizzi@murraystate.edu

Bryce Reeder
University of Missouri, reederbw@missouri.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.murraystate.edu/faculty
Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, and the Latin American Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Arce, Moisés, Marc S. Polizzi, and Bryce W. Reeder. 2020. "Willingness to Protest over Resource Extraction
in Latin America." The Extractive Industries and Society 7(2): 716-728.

This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by Murray State's Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty & Staff Research and Creative Activity by an authorized administrator of Murray
State's Digital Commons. For more information, please contact msu.digitalcommons@murraystate.edu.

Willingness to Protest over Resource Extraction in Latin America
Moises Arce
Tulane University
Department of Political Science
New Orleans, LA 70118
marce@tulane.edu
Marc S. Polizzi
Department of Political Science & Sociology
Murray State University
Murray, KY 42071

mpolizzi@murraystate.edu
Bryce W. Reeder
Department of Political Science
University of Missouri
Columbia, MO 65201
reederbw@missouri.edu

Willingness to Protest over Resource Extraction in Latin America

Abstract: Protests over resource extraction have increased in Latin America in recent years.
However, significant variation exists in the region in terms of citizen’s willingness to protest
against resource extraction. We argue that this variation is based on the interaction of factors at
both the individual and state levels. Individual-level characteristics, such as social engagement,
influence the likelihood of protest activity. State-level characteristics, such as the quality of
governance, also present opportunities for engaged individuals to challenge resource extraction.
Following political mediation theory, we argue that collective action strategies are likely to be
more productive in some political contexts than in others. Thus socially engaged citizens in highquality governance environments are more willing to participate in protests over resource
extraction vis-a-vis their counterparts in low-quality governance settings. We utilize survey data
and state-level governance data across Latin America to determine why some individuals are
willing to demonstrate against resource extraction while others are not.
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1. Introduction
Latin America has the highest number of resource conflicts in the world (Özkaynak et al.,
2015), and countries like Peru, Mexico, and Chile experience the most conflicts (OCMAL, 2017).
Latin America is also known to be the world’s most dangerous region for environmental activists,
including those who contest resource extraction (Global Witness 2014). Existing literature has
sought to explore the varied motivations and goals pursued by citizens near the extractive frontier
(e.g., Arsel et al., 2016a; Arce, 2014, 2016; Bebbington & Bury, 2013; Conde & Le Billon, 2017;
Svampa & Antonelli, 2009). This scholarship shows that protesters seek to defend basic rights,
such as water access and quality, the integrity of land and landscapes, and/or the cultural survival
of indigenous peoples; other protesters seek a more equitable distribution of the revenues,
royalties, or other economic benefits generated from extraction.
Much of the existing literature examines the variation of resource conflicts cross-nationally
(Arce & Miller, 2016; Arce et al., 2018; Haslam & Tanimoune, 2015) and sub-nationally (Arce &
Hendricks, 2019; Arellano-Yanguas, 2010; Mähler & Pierskalla, 2015; Ponce & McClintock,
2014; Orihuela et al., 2019). Some studies examine the relationship between mineral wealth and
conflicts (Arce & Hendricks, 2019; Arellano-Yanguas, 2010). Other studies explore the
relationship between geo-referenced extractive areas and conflicts (Haslam & Tanimoune, 2015;
Mähler & Pierskalla, 2015). Together, these studies confirm the extraction-conflict nexus.
However, while studies have used individual-level surveys to explore protest participation more
generally (Moseley, 2015; Boulding, 2014), none have examined why individuals are willing to
protest over resource extraction across Latin America.1 What individual- and state-level factors
influence citizens’ willingness to protest over extraction?
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As several studies document, there are clear power imbalances in the negotiations over
resource extraction between host communities and extractive industries. Backed by national
governments embracing the “extractive imperative” (Arsel et al., 2016b)2, extractive industries
diffuse the claims of protesters by providing selective material rewards to the leaders of protest
organizations (e.g., bribes or employment opportunities) or by spending money on high-profile
projects in collaboration with local authorities, mostly municipal mayors (e.g., the beautification
of the town’s central plaza or the rebuilding of the town’s school). The goal is to win the support
of the local population and authorities through a series of small concessions. Citizens who are
opposed to resource extraction as a development strategy face the daunting challenge of reversing
or blocking mining concessions; their resistance efforts entail the sustained social engagement of
networks of activists and their organizations. In other cases, protesters are not opposed to
extraction, but rather seek to negotiate (or re-negotiate) the terms of extraction. Protesters demand
prior consultation rights, make calls for environmental and social impact studies, and petition
equitable distribution of resource rents to host communities (Conde, 2016; Conde & Le Billon,
2017).3
Moreover, as Boulding (2014) and Moseley (2015) show, individuals do not make political
decisions in a vacuum. Rather, the context in which they operate affects their political behavior
(similar Barnes & Córdova, 2016). Moseley (2015) has aptly shown that the quality of institutions
shapes an individual’s decision to attend a protest rally or demonstration. Specifically, sociallyengaged citizens in low-quality institutional settings are substantially more likely to protest
because they are unable to influence policy via state instituions as these are perceived to be
ineffective or unresponsive. In this view, formal institutions operate as a safety valve for citizen
complaint and satisfaction, but this safety valve malfunctions when institutional structures become
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unresponsive to societal demands, making “street protests” the relief mechanism for built-up
societal pressure.
While protests are commonly viewed as a byproduct of ineffective and unresponsive
institutions, our paper examines an individual’s willingness to protest over resource extraction (not
her actual participation in a protest rally or demonstration as in Moseley), and advances an
alternative interpretation of the impact of institutions on protest likelihood. Building on political
mediation theory (Amenta & Young, 1999; Amenta, Caren, Chiarello, & Su, 2010), we argue that
the success of collective action is politically mediated as movements are more influential in some
institutional contexts as opposed to others. This theory suggests that protests and political
outcomes are rarely connected directly. Rather, the impact of protests on outcomes is mostly
indirect or mediated by the institutional context in which they occur. These institutions produce a
country’s policymaking capabilities and policy characteristics, and they range from court decisions
to legislative decrees and executive orders. Therefore, we argue that the quality of national
policymaking shapes an individual’s willingness to participate in protests over resource extraction
as this environment often determines the capacity of the state to deliver on protesters’ demands. In
countries with a high quality of governance, citizens are willing to protest over resource extraction
because they perceive the government as possessing the capacity to address their claims.
Conversely, in countries with a low quality of governance, socially-engaged citizens view
institutions as incapable of addressing long-term policymaking change, and accordingly, are less
willing to protest over resource extraction.4
We begin this article by providing background information on the significance of resource
extraction to developing Latin American economies, including a discussion of how extraction
encourages contention. Thereafter, we explain how governance quality mediates the relationship
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between social engagement and the likelihood to protest. We precede the presentation of our
research design with two examples from the region. The empirical section of the article draws on
cross-national surveys of Latin America (Latinobarómetro, 2015) and state-level data from the
Inter-American Development Bank’s Governance Quality Index (Franco Chuaire & Scartascini,
2014) to examine the variation in protest likelihood in the region. The conclusion summarizes the
contributions of this article and suggests new areas for future research.
2. Resource Extraction as a Development Strategy
Driven by record-high commodity prices, extractive sector investments increased nearly
ten-fold between 2000 and 2013, from US$ 86 billion to US$ 735 billion (ECLAC, 2013). In 2014,
Latin American received approximately 25 percent of global exploration investment flows and
held more than 28 percent of the world’s mineral investment portfolio. The region is the world’s
leading source of minerals and the second most important source of oil (ECLAC, 2013). It
produces 15 percent of the world’s gold, 45 percent of silver and 40 percent of copper. Peru,
Mexico and Chile are the top gold, silver, and copper producers, respectively. In 2013, according
to the World Trade Organization (2014), oil and minerals accounted for 40 percent of total Latin
American exports, compared to a global average of 22 percent. In the same year, extractive
activities’ rents represented more than 15 percent of GDP in resource-rich Latin American
countries (Walter, 2016).
While resource extraction contributes to regional macroeconomic growth, the “extractive
imperative” (Arsel et al., 2016b) as a national development strategy also leads to clashes with host
communities over the use of land and water. However, not all mobilizations against resource
extraction concern the adverse impact of mining on livelihoods and the environment. Soaring
commodity prices yield remarkable profits, and mining-related taxes have become the most
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important intergovernmental transfer linked to resource extraction. These transfers encourage a
sizeable number of mobilizations over the distribution and use of these resource revenues across
multiple tiers of government—local, provincial, regional and national. Challengers also seek
improved transparency on resource revenues (Haufler 2014).
Likewise, protesters increasingly challenge private firms directly over the state—especially
in localities with large-scale mining firms (Haslam & Tanimoune, 2016; Gustafsson, 2017).
Amengual (2018) shows that when local movements are fragmented, multinational mining firms
target specific organizations with private goods to placate opposition and protect future access to
mining locations. However, the state remains at the epicenter of most extractive conflicts as several
campaigns include claims related to environmental degradation, land rights and the protection of
livelihoods.
3. Individual and Contextual Factors Shaping Protest Likelihood
Moseley (2015) uses the Latin American Public Opinion Project’s (LAPOP)
AmericasBarometer surveys to examine the individual- and state-level characteristics, explaining
the variation in protest participation across twenty-four countries in Latin America. Substantively,
his paper reveals the importance of civic engagement as a main driver of contention. As Moseley
(2015) explains:
[e]gaged citizens are more likely protestors for two reasons. First, they are more likely to
have access to the key organizational tools required for communicating and mobilizing.
Second, through their active involvement in political and nonpolitical organizations, they
have more exposure to the relative strengths and weaknesses of formal institutional
structures, which provides them with information about the necessity and/or effectiveness
of protest participation. (p. 13)
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Moreover, Moseley (2015) shows that institutional quality conditions civic engagement,
shaping an individual’s decision to mobilize. While low-quality institutions incite protest
participation, high-quality institutions, which allow citizens to influence policy via state
institutions, suppress it. Institutions thus operate as a safety mechanism for citizen complaint and
satisfaction; when institutions are ineffective or unresponsive, protests follow. In Moseley’s (2015)
words: “[e]ngaged citizens in low-quality institutional environments are almost twice as likely to
participate in a protest as their counterparts in high-quality institutional settings” (p. 30-31).
Therefore, social engagement and institutional quality interact to explain the variation in protest
participation in Latin America.
We agree with Moseley (2015) on the salience of civic engagement as it relates to protest
likelihood, but we differ on the effects of institutions. Following political mediation theory
(Amenta & Young, 1999; Amenta et al., 2010), we argue that collective action strategies are likely
to be more productive in some political contexts than in others. Accordingly, challengers’ ability
to influence outcomes depends partly on conditions they can control (e.g., their ability to mobilize,
forms of organization, and strategies) and partly on the varied political contexts and institutional
settings they face.5 Crucial to this argument, this literature informs us that protests’ effects on
outcomes are rarely direct. Instead, a broad range of institutions involved in the policymaking
process – from the enforcement to the adjudication of the law (e.g., court decisions, legislative
decrees and executive orders) – shape the long-term consequences of protests. To be clear, the
paper does not examine the outcomes of protests.

Rather it suggests that an individual’s

willingness to protest over resource extraction is shaped by what government institutions may
accomplish as a result of her collective action.
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Because individuals lack complete information, institutions become a salient source of
external data and provide cues to determine citizens’ policy stances. These “source cues”—or
heuristics—reduce citizens’ position-taking costs thereby conditioning their proclivity to
participate in politics (Barnes & Córdova, 2016, p. 673; Zaller, 1992; Mondak, 1993).6
Specifically, Barnes and Córdova (2016) argue that citizens utilize information “on the
institutional capacity of government as a whole and . . . on the capacity of the different institutions
that make up government to work cooperatively and consistently [to] produce good policy
outcomes” (p. 673-674). Consequently, challengers assess collective action strategies based on the
government’s ability as a whole, and not isolated to the current administration, to deliver social
policies affecting citizens’ daily lives. If government cannot provide basic services to citizens, then
“the government is unlikely to gain sufficient credibility in the eyes of the public to secure high
policy support” (Barnes & Córdova, 2016, p. 674), leaving even socially-engaged citizens in such
settings with little incentive to mobilize. Conversely, socially-engaged citizens in high-quality
governance environments are willing to participate in a protest rally or demonstration because they
perceive a higher probability of influencing positive outcomes as compared to in low-quality
governance environments.
Our dependent variable also differs from Moseley (2015). Moseley’s dependent variable
asks respondents if they participated in a street march or public demonstration in the previous
twelve months,7 but does not address likely political action against resource extraction specifically.
In Moseley’s sample, for instance, Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina were most likely to experience
protests, while El Salvador, Panama, and the Dominican Republic were least likely to. By contrast,
in our sample, the countries where respondents are more willing to protest over resource extraction
were Colombia, Chile, and Costa Rica, while Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela were the least
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willing. This comparison goes to show that the countries that experience protest participation at
large are different from the countries where citizens are willing to protest over resource extraction.
To summarize, protests over resource extraction may take on a variety of issues, from
environmental protection to indigenous self-determination to the distribution of resource revenues,
and can last several weeks, months, or even years. Challengers employ myriad strategies to set the
extraction agenda, open a direct dialogue with government officials, or adapt existing policies
(Silva, Akchurin, & Bebbington, 2018). Such efforts require a stable policymaking environment
to achieve these long-term objectives. In our view, a citizen’s institutional environment is not a
static feature that triggers higher or lower levels of collective action. Rather, a citizen’s willingness
to protest over resource extraction is shaped by her ability to leverage the strengths of the
institutional environment to her advantage. Thus, the willingness to participate in a protest over
resource extraction should be higher / lower where the quality of governance environment is strong
/ weak.
Before going further, an important clarification about the role of institutions is warranted.
Eisenger (1973) and Tarrow (1998) argued that we should observe a curvilinear relationship
between protests and the openness of political institutions. Open political structures discourage
protests by extending conventional means of political participation to redress grievances. Closed
political structures also discourage protests because of repression, which altogether disincentivizes
protest. But protest is higher in mixed political structures because some access to political
institutions exists and the state’s capacity to repress is somewhat limited.8 These arguments focus
on the emergence of protest, specifically the mobilization of challengers. Additionally, critics
argue that political structure models are often conceptualized too broadly to be tested empirically
(Goodwin & Jasper, 1999). In contrast, we focus on how the policymaking capabilities and policy
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characteristics of different polities mediate the likelihood to shape positive outcomes. Hence, when
we speak about the governance environment, we are thinking about policymaking capabilities and
policy characteristics, not formal institutions (i.e., the relative openness of political structures).
4. Protesters and their Governance Environment
To recast our main argument, the governance environment that challengers face shapes
their likely participation in politics. A high-quality governance environment emboldens aggrieved
groups by highlighting the state’s ability to meet these grievances, consequently reinforcing
engaged citizens’ willingness to participate in collective action. In contrast, a low-quality
governance state discourages engaged citizens to participate in politics as they perceive a lower
probability of indirectly influencing outcomes vis-à-vis weak policymaking institutions.
Two examples may help illustrate how citizens in extractive areas interact with institutions
to achieve their goals. As the literature shows, extractive conflicts are varied and involve different
sets of grievances. One illustrative case focuses on a conflict over the distribution of mining’s
benefits; the other case demonstrates a conflict over basic rights. For our purposes however, the
nature of the grievance is less relevant than the interaction that mobilizations have with
governmental institutions.
On the one hand, leading copper producer Chile has 37 resource related conflicts, the
second highest number of observed conflicts regionally (OCMAL, 2017). The country also
possesses high-quality governance environment based on the Inter-American Development Bank’s
Governance Quality Index (Franco Chuaire & Scartascini, 2014). It has a Governance Quality
score of 2.35—among the highest levels in our sample (about 1.962 standard deviations above the
mean). A high-quality governance state like Chile is expected to have several resource conflicts
(see Figures 1 and 3).
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Chile’s copper mines are located in the northern region of the country, specifically in the
underpopulated areas of the Atacama Desert. When union contracts expire, typically every three
to four years, it sets the stage for new negotiations to establish new wages and benefits, and if these
talks fail, union workers strike. In February 2017, negotiations were unsuccessful and the 2,500
member-union at Escondida, the world’s largest copper mine operated by BHP Billiton, went on
strike. Union workers demanded a salary increase of 7 percent and a bonus. Escondida, in turn,
offered a third of the bonus demanded by the union with no salary increase. Union workers ended
the strike by invoking a rarely used legal provision, Article 369, allowing them to extend their old
contract for 18 months, after which both parties must try to reach a new agreement, and companies
like Escondida are legally obligated to comply.
The strike lasted 43 days, ending just before major labor law changes, which were widely
seen as bolstering organized labor groups. President Michelle Bachelet’s center-left government
approved the new law in 2016. The new law requires companies to offer the minimum benefits in
a previous contract as the negotiating floor. By returning to their old contracts, union workers will
enjoy existing benefits and working conditions. But more importantly, they will hold the next
round of negotiations under the “upcoming labor law that strengthens their hand.” 9 The union
told media outlets that the labor law changes “had informed their negotiations.”10
On the other hand, Ecuador posseses significant oil reserves. The country produces
approximately 557,000 barrels of oil per day (OPEC, 2015), with oil rents comprising
approximately 13.7 percent of its 2014 GDP (World Bank, 2016).11 Unlike Chile, Ecuador only
has 7 resource conflicts, among the fewest number of conflicts in our sample (sample mean is
12.38) (OCMAL, 2017). Ecuador also has a Governance Quality score of 1.01, far lower than the
1.41 mean value (about .824 standard deviations below the mean) (see Figure 3).
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In Ecuador, demands for environmental justice over the negative externalities of oil
extraction have been common and aggrieved groups have funneled their claims through the courts.
In 1993, for instance, Ecuadorian indigenous people of the Oriente region filed a class action
lawsuit in a US federal court against Texaco (Aguinda v. Texaco).12 The complainants alleged
that between 1964 and 1992 Texaco’s oil operations polluted the rainforests and rivers in Ecuador,
resulting in environmental damage and detrimental health effects for locals. Chevron acquired
Texaco in 2001. In 2002, the US federal court dismissed the lawsuit, deciding Ecuador was the
appropriate venue for litigating these claims.
In 2011, an Ecuadorian judge charged Texaco/Chevron for extensive environmental and
cultural damages. The court ordered Chevron pay $8.6 billion in damages and clean-up costs, with
damages increasing to $18 billion if Chevron did not issue a public apology. After several court
appeals, Ecuador’s Supreme Court upheld the ruling against Texaco/Chevron for environmental
damages, but halved damages to $9.51 billion.
The ruling set off a lengthy, complex series of international proceedings, including
international arbitration because the ruling violated a US-Ecuador bilateral investment treaty,
lawsuits in Canada targeting Chevron assets in this country, and a racketeering lawsuit against the
complainant’s lawyers and representatives in US federal court because the ruling in Ecuador
involved a conspiracy to commit extortion.
In March 2014, US district judge Lewis Kaplan ruled in Chevron’s favor, finding that the
Ecuadorian community’s lawyers fabricated evidence, made bribes, and ghost-wrote court
documents. The plaintiffs were therefore barred from collecting the $9.51 billion judgment
because the “decision was obtained by corrupt means.” In August 2016, a US Court of Appeals
agreed with the lower court’s ruling. In June 2017, the US Supreme Court declined to hear the
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plaintiffs’ appeal, meaning that the lower court decision, blocking the enforcement of the
Ecuadorian award, stood.
Ecuadorian indigenous groups often rely on international allies to further their claims
against oil drilling (Eisenstadt & West, 2017). For example, American activist-lawyer Steven
Donziger and California-based Pachamama Foundation led the charge in the $9.51 billion
judgment. While these alliances speak to the generally inadequate political representation of
indigenous people, they also reveal Ecuador’s low-quality governmenance environment. Chevron
did not deny the environmental damage in the Ecuadorian rainforest, but when Texaco/Chevron
drilled for oil in Ecuador, they were doing so as a partner of PetroEcuador (formerly CEPE), the
country’s state-run oil company.13 Indigenous groups “strongly criticized the central government’s
failure to attend to environmental degradation, but were divided over whether to further explore
and drill for oil (Eisenstadt & West, 2017, p. 245). Moreover, when Attorney Donziger was shown
evidence contradicting the contamination spread from oil pits, he was unyielding. “This is
Ecuador, O.K.,” he said. “At the end of the day, there are a thousand people around the courthouse,
you will get whatever you want. Sorry, but it’s true.”14
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
To summarize—and following political mediation theory—a protest rally or demonstration
seldom decides its final outcome. Instead, movements interact with several institutions, such the
federal, provincial, or local governments, to influence positive outcomes. Our two examples
demonstrate this logic. The conflicts in Chile and Ecuador surrounded divergent grievances. The
Chilean conflict encompassed the distribution of benefits, while the Ecuadorean case was a dispute
over basic rights. Nonetheless, protests alone did not determine the either dispute’s outcome, and
the successful outcome of these events depended on positive interactions with institutions. In
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Chile, union workers drew on their governance environment’s strengths, including Article 369 and
the new labor law, to achieve positive results. In contrast, despite the well-known mobilizing
capacity of Ecuador’s indigenous peoples, the country’s low-quality governance environment
diminished their ability to affect change. Indigenous groups tend to rely on third-party actors (e.g.,
Attorney Donziger) and other international allies (e.g., the Pachamama Foundation) to funnel
claims. In all, the governance environment shapes individual decision-making as it provides an
information source that help determine the likelihood of achieving positive outcomes. These
examples, however, only provide circumstancial evidence to illustrate our argument. To identify
general patterns, we turn to the empirical analysis next.
5. Data and Methods
To test our central argument, we use the Latinobarómetro (2015) survey for individuallevel variables, and the Inter-American Development Bank’s Government Capabilities Index
(Franco Chuaire & Scartascini, 2014) for country-level governance quality. The Latinobarómetro
is a cross-sectional study employing the survey respondent as its unit of analysis. It includes a
randomized sample of 20,250 respondents within 18 Latin American countries.15 As such, it
creates nationally-representative, random, and stratified surveys that reach both urban and rural
populations to develop a more robust and representative sampling of the total population, rather
than selecting the sample on the dependent variable by only analyzing groups most likely to
participate in these protest actions. As a result of this operationalization, our findings can only be
generalized to the region in the specified time period. However, given the importance of resource
extraction to the economies of several developing countries, it remains an important sample to
analyze.16
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We use the survey question regarding an individual’s stated likelihood to protest over
resource extraction as our dependent variable (hereafter, Protest). Latinobarómetro asks
respondents to choose a Likert scale value from 1 (not at all likely) to 10 (very likely) based on
their agreement with the statement: “…how willing would you be to demonstrate and protest about
the extraction of natural resources?” The median response is 6 on the 10-point scale. Figure 2
displays the average response for each country in our sample. Colombia and Ecuador have the
highest (7.01) and lowest (4.23) average protest likelihoods, respectively.17
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
5.1. Individual-Level Characteristics
At the individual-level, an individual’s perceptions of social networks as a tool of political
action serves as our key independent variable (hereafter, Social Engagement). As stated above,
social networks provide the organizational resources necessary for collective action, as well as the
opportunities to join like-minded citizens. For this measure, we use individuals’ attitudes of social
networks as a viable channel for political participation. Respondents are asked to pick the
statement with which they most agree: “Social networks allow you to participate in politics”;
“Social networks create the illusion that you are participating in politics”; “Social networks are
not suitable for participat[ion] in politics.” The recoded variable, Social Engagement, is
dichotomous, whereby the survey response of “Social networks allow you to participate in
politics” is coded 1, and 0 otherwise.18 The decision to exclude respondents answering “Social
networks create the illusion that you are participating” is due to the greater subjectiveness of the
statement. While one could interpret the question as implying social networks are a form of lowcost activism without connection to other forms of political action, another individual could
interpret social networks as a form of expressing grievances outside of the formal political system.
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Social engagement plays a vital role in an individual’s likelihood to participate in collective
action. Research on non-electoral participation finds that networks provide the organizational
resources and opportunities necessary for individuals to engage in collective action (Jenkins, 1983;
McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Following resource mobilization literature, engaged citizens have access
to participation channels that are unavailable to disconnected citizens. When individuals view
social engagement as a useful avenue for political participation, then they are also likely to be
politically interested, be politically sophisticated, join activities and organizations, and are likely
to participate in collective action.
We also include several controls found to affect mobilization likelihood, such as an
individual’s civic participation level, the frequency she campaigns for political parties (Campaign
Frequency), democracy support, presidential approval, interpersonal trust, and personal and
national economic perceptions (see Appendix, Table 3). Additionally, we control for demographic
characteristics such as gender, age, socioeconomic status, and education years.
Because our dependent variable (Protest) measures an individual’s willingness to protest
over resource extraction, not actual participation, we also control for the individual’s previous
protest activity (Protest Activity). We use survey answers based on participation in either an
authorized or unauthorized march or demonstration (see Appendix, Table 2). By controlling for
actual participation, we isolate an individual’s willingness to protest over resource extraction.
As environmental attitudes often relate to resource extraction protests (Eisenstadt & West,
2017), we also control for environmental issue salience (hereafter, Environment). The
Latinobarómetro (2015) asks respondents to name the most important factors for national
development. Respondents choose items such as infrastructure, institutions, social policies, and
the environment. We created a dichotomous measure based on respondent answers mentioning the
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environment. We expect individuals’ protest likelihood to increase if they prioritize the
environment when thinking about development.
Finally, we account for a respondent’s proximity to and experience with extraction by
including a measurement of the sum total number of mining properties within a 30-kilometer
radius of a survey respondent (hereafter, Proximity to extraction). We utilize information from
Infomine (2011), updated by Haslam and Tanimoune (2015), to determine the known universe of
firms in the region operating at the advanced exploration stage or above. These data provide the
geospatial locations of 783 active properties in 23 countries. We then determine the number of
mining properties located close to a survey respondent using a distance of 30 kilometers from a
survey area to the closest mining property. We derive the survey area by using the geographic
location variable found in Latinobarómetro, which is known as city (or ciudad) and refers to the
smallest political or administrative division of a state.
5.2. Country-Level Characteristics
For country-level data, we utilize the Government Capabilities Index from the Political
Institutions, Government Capabilities, and Public Policy International Dataset created by the InterAmerican Development Bank (Franco Chuaire & Scartascini, 2014). This index measures each
country’s policymaking capabilities among four major institutional bodies:

the legislature,

political parties, the judiciary, and bureaucracies. Previous studies found that these institutions
often determine policymaking’s effectiveness (Stein & Tommasi, 2007). This continuous-level
measure ranges from 0 to 4, with lower values indicating low-quality policymaking capabilities. It
ranges from .77 (Venezuela) to 2.36 (Costa Rica).
We refer to this variable as a country’s Governance Quality. Its dimensions include public
policy stability, adaptability, coordination, efficiency, and public regardedness.19

It also
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incorporates legislative capabilities, judicial independence, political party institutionalization, and
civil service quality. Furthermore, the variable follows the logic of “intertemporal cooperation,”
meaning these data reflect the policymaking environment as an ongoing process of cumulative
institutionalization of a government’s capabilities rather than a reflection of the incumbent
administration (Scartascini & Tommasi, 2014, p. 5-6). It also biases “cooperation as opposed to
imposition” in the policymaking arena (Scartascini & Tommasi, 2014, p. 5).
Our Governance Quality measure is an appropriate operationalization of our central
argument. This variable considers overall effectiveness of national institutions in providing dayto-day basic services across a wide range of policy issues, rather than focusing on a single policy
dimension. Our hypothesis states that an individual’s willingness to protest over resource
extraction increases when they perceive the government as having the capacity to respond to their
demands. If the state fails to provide basic services, then even highly-engaged citizens will be
unwilling to protest over resource extraction as they do not perceive a policymaking environment
capable of addressing their grievances. Building on political mediation theory—protests have an
indirect or mediated effect on outcomes—the state’s policymaking capabilities are crucial in
responding to the claims of protesters, and thus the perceived efficacy of protests. Therefore, we
expect socially-engaged individuals to utilize their available resources to protest resource
extraction when they believe a greater government capacity to deliver good policy outcomes. In
contrast, citizens will be unlikely to view protests as an effective means of change when the
policymaking environment is weak, regardless of their level of social engagement. Figure 3 shows
the variation of this measure for our sample.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]

18

We also include country-level controls to prevent spuriousness in our correlations, such as
the natural log of population size, GDP growth, and GINI coefficients. Population and GDP growth
data come from the World Bank (2015) and GINI data come from the Standardized World Income
Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt, 2016).
5.3. Methods
We estimate multilevel models to account for the nested nature of our data (i.e., individualand country-level characteristics) (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). Our data contain information for
individuals i within countries j. Multilevel modeling permit coefficients to vary randomly within
the groups (countries j), allowing for the estimation of standard errors while assuming correlation
of error terms within these groups. Snijders and Bosker (2012, p. 106) also explain that cross-level
interaction terms can be used to test interactions at the individual- and country-levels.20
Following this logic, we test three models. The first tests only individual-level
characteristics, the second adds country-level characteristics, and the third model tests the
interaction between Social Engagement (measured at the individual-level) and Governance
Quality (measured at the country-level). We expect to find a positive correlation between this
interactive term and an individual’s willingness to protest over resource extraction. Our dependent
variable (Protest) is ordinal (10-point scale), therefore, we estimate our models using ordered
logistic multilevel models with random intercepts.
6. Results
Table 1 presents our empirical results. Model 1 uses only individual-level variables to
predict willingness to protest over resource extraction. These results confirm previous protest
participation studies (Moseley, 2015). According to our model, socially-engaged individuals, who
are civically-minded and campaign frequently, are more likely on average to protest over resource
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extraction than less engaged individuals. We also explore the substantive impact of these variables
(see Table 2). Based on Model 1, a socially-engaged, civically-minded individual who campaigns
frequently has close to a 30 percent likelihood of being very likely to protest (a 10 on the 10-point
protest scale), while a person who is at a 0 on each of these variables is only 19.32 percent likely
(a difference of about 10 percent).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Models 2 and 3 show the results for the multilevel model and the interactive model,
respectively. As shown in Model 2, Governance Quality has a positive and statistically significant
effect on an individual’s likelihood to protest over resource extraction. Model 3 shows the results
for the interaction (Social Engagement * Governance Quality), which is a more direct test of the
individual’s decision-making calculus over resource extraction. Following Brambor, Clark, and
Golder (2006, p. 66), the constitutive terms of the interaction are included in the respective models.
The results show a positive and statistically significant relationship between the interaction
variable and protest likelihood. These findings are consistent when including individual- and statelevel controls.
Several control measures appear to be significant predictors of willingness to protest over
resource extraction. Civic participation, Campaign frequency, and Education years are positive
and statistically significant across all models, which suggests that civically-minded individuals,
who are politically-knowledgeable and well-educated, are more likely to protest than those who
are less civically-minded. Age is negative and statistically significant. Protest activity and
Environment are both positive and statistically significant predictors of willingness to protest.
Predictably, concern over environmental protection positively influences protest likelihood. It is
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also intuitive that previous protest engagement increases protest likelihood. Therefore, even when
controlling for actual participation in a demonstration, march, or protest, our findings are robust.
Finally, Proximity to extraction is positive and statistically significant (see Model 4), indicating
that an individual is willing to protest over extraction when she is located directly in the vicinity
of these activities.
Table 1’s results only tell us the direction and significance of key independent variables.
Therefore, we also present the predicted means of our interaction variable to determine the
substantive impact of our central argument. Figure 4, based on individuals who are very willing to
protest extraction (i.e., a “10” on Protest), demonstrates that higher governance quality levels
increase individual protest likelihood. Moreover, socially-engaged individuals possess a higher
likelihood than non-socially-engaged ones. As predicted probabilities, a socially-engaged person
is about 10 percent more likely to be a “10” on this scale than a non-socially-engaged individual,
when Governance Quality is at its highest value (2.36) and all other variables are held constant.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Our results speak to existing findings on resource conflicts in Latin America. The
expectation is that countries with high Governance Quality values are more likely to see extractive
conflicts. Figure 1 is a map of known conflicts near extractive sites, using data from Haslam and
Tanimoune (2015). For instance, Chile has both a high Governance Quality and a high number of
extractive conflicts (see Figure 1). Ecuador, on the other hand, has far fewer conflicts and possesses
a much lower Governance Quality value. Chile and Ecuador are, in fact, at opposite extremes when
it comes to the number of resource conflicts and governance quality. We find the same trend in
this paper: an individual’s willingness to participate in a protest against resource extraction
increases in high-quality Governance Quality states.
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Institutions are not static configurations that incentivize collective action in a given time
period. Rather challengers ponder their ability to influence outcomes based on the institutional
environment where they live, and this, in turn, affects their willingness to engage in collective
action. As shown in Figure 4, a high-quality governance environment reinforces engaged citizens’
willingness to protest over resource extraction because institutions are seen as “source cues” of a
government’s general capacity to deliver good policy outcomes (similar Barnes & Córdova, 2016).
7. Sensitivity Analysis
In addition to Table 1’s models, we conducted several robustness tests to ensure the
stability of our findings. First, our measure of social networks (redes sociales) may be interpreted
by some respondents as social media use to obtain and share political information. Despite the
generic language of social networks, which can apply to several formal or informal social
connections, we nevertheless control for frequency of e-mail and internet usage (hereafter, Social
Media). The sensitivity analysis results are consistent with our previous findings (see Appendix,
Table 4).
Second, while we argue that our main country-level independent variable, Governance
Quality, is the most robust operationalization of our central argument, we must consider the
likelihood that our results are simply a function of this particular measure. Hence, we use the
World Bank’s Quality of Governance Indicators as alternative measures of a country’s governance
environment. These measures account for the strength of democratic institutions and overall
government effectiveness perceptions, and include separate components of Rule of Law,
Government Effectiveness, and Voice and Accountability. Following Moseley (2015), we also
create an additive index of these three components (hereafter, Additive).21 Our results are
consistent with our previous models when we use either the Additive measure of government
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capabilities or if we use the constituent terms separately (see Appendix, Table 5). Overall, the
stability of our results across different operationalizations of our independent variable and the use
of exhaustive controls, demonstrates the robustness of our findings.
8. Conclusion
Existing resource conflict literature mostly dwells on event data from the print media to
explore the factors affecting mobilization cross-nationally and sub-nationally. Resource conflict
case studies also examine the coalitions and organizations that drive successful campaigns against
extractive projects. While these works have made important contributions, none examine
individual willingness to protest extraction across Latin America.
Our paper shows that both individual- and state-level factors influence an individual’s
willingness to challenge resource extraction. Socially engaged individuals are more willing to
protest over resource extraction because, through their active participation in networks and
organizations, they are more acquainted with the relative strengths and weaknesses of their
institutional environment, which altogether provides them with information about the expediency
of collective action. Governance quality, in particular, presents opportunities for engaged
individuals to challenge resource extraction, albeit in a different way than anticipated by the
existing literature.
The conventional wisdom, in fact, frames protests as a byproduct of ineffective and
unresponsive institutions. This argument centers on formal institutions (e.g., the relative openness
of political structures), and critics have pointed out that political structure offers only a mechanistic
understanding of social movements (Goodwin & Jasper, 2003). In contrast, political mediation
theory (Amenta & Young, 1999; Amenta et al., 2010) informs us that movements continuously
interact with institutions in a dynamic process to influence positive outcomes. Our review of
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resource conflicts shows that, while mobilizations may have a short-term impact on outcomes, the
long-term consequences of mobilizations involves a continuous interaction with several different
institutions. These institutions are linked to a country’s policymaking capabilities and policy
characteristics, ranging from court decisions to legislative decrees and executive orders. Thus, a
strong governance track-record reinforces an engaged citizen’s willingness to protest over resource
extraction because different governmental institutions are seen as “source cues” of good policy
outcomes (similar Barnes & Córdova, 2016). In low-quality governance environments, by contrast,
citizens are deprived of this salient source of information, and accordingly, they are less likely to
protest over resource extraction.
While our results show that the likelihood of collective action over resource extraction is
politically mediated, there are several instances where citizens contest fiercely against mining,
even leading to the deaths of protesters (Bond & Kirsch, 2015). Global Witness (2014) records
1,024 deaths of environmental activists between 2002 and 2014 around the world—a period that
overlaps with the escalation of extractive conflicts globally. In 2017, almost 60% of the killings
registered were from Latin America and Brazil had the highest number of deaths (57 people)
(Global Witness 2017). Citizens near extractive areas seek to defend basic rights (e.g., water
access, the cultural survival of indigenous peoples) in response to the ecological threats associated
with mining. Leaders of social organizations fighting extraction have also faced arrests, police
violence, defamation, intimidation, and other forms of repression. Future research should
investigate how these forms of repression impact collective action over resource extraction.
Our study on the willingness to participate in protests over resource extraction is limited
by the Latinobarómetro surveys’ questions. Yet we find congruence between our measure of social
engagement and Moseley’s indicator of community engagement—an indicator that gauges the
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frequency with which citizens participate in local organizations. Both indicators capture the dense
organizational networks that are pivotal to sustain mobilizations. The Latinobarómetro surveys
also do not allow us to explore the reasons for the challenge. However, building on Eisenstadt and
West (2019), future research should explore the environmental attitudes of citizens living near
extractive areas, including how the expectation of benefits from extraction may mitigate some of
their environmental concerns.
Future research should also explore how extractive industries interact with social and
political organizations to avoid conflict and gain access to resources. Amengual (2018) recently
showed that extractive industries distribute benefits in inclusive ways when cohesive social
organizations are present. Conversely, extractive industries distribute benefits in targeted (or
clientelistic) ways when fragmented social organizations are present. Gustafsson (2017) also
showed that when host communities are politically weak relative to extractive industries,
corporate-community relations are likely to result in demobilization or clientelism. However, when
host communities are able to establish a more equitable balance of power, corporate-community
relationships tend to produce either confrontation or strategic collaboration. Successful resistance
campaigns against resource extraction are proportional to the activists’ network cohesion. And, as
this paper shows, the likelihood of these campaigns to influence positive outcomes increases when
protest movements leverage the strengths of their institutional environment to their advantage.
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Figure 1: Location of Mining Conflicts in Latin America

Source: Haslam and Tanimoune (2015).
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Figure 2. Mean Likelihood to Protest over Resource Extraction

Source: Latinobarómetro (2015).
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Figure 3. Mean Value of Governance Quality

Source: Franco Chuaire & Scartascini (2015).
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Table 1: Likelihood to Protest over Resource Extraction
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Individual-Level
Governance
Governance
Quality *
Social
Engagement
Individual-Level Variables
Social Engagement
0.251***
0.231***
-0.182
(0.046)
(0.045)
(0.161)

Model 4___
Proximity

-0.184
(0.187)

Civic Participation

0.209***
(0.047)

0.218***
(0.048)

0.215***
(0.049)

0.210***
(0.054)

Campaign Frequency

0.125***
(0.031)

0.125***
(0.033)

0.126***
(0.032)

0.132***
(0.032)

Gender

-0.009
(0.030)

-0.013
(0.032)

-0.014
(0.033)

-0.005
(0.033)

Age

-0.012***
(0.002)

-0.013***
(0.002)

-0.013***
(0.002)

-0.013***
(0.002)

Socioeconomic Status

0.016
(0.027)

0.012
(0.028)

0.012
(0.028)

0.012
(0.030)

Education Years

0.013**
(0.005)

0.013**
(0.005)

0.013**
(0.005)

0.012**
(0.006)

Presidential Approval

-0.075
(0.057)

-0.055
(0.054)

-0.054
(0.053)

-0.036
(0.055)

Interpersonal Trust

-0.006
(0.070)

0.015
(0.069)

0.013
(0.070)

0.030
(0.069)

Personal Economic
Perceptions

0.042
(0.027)

0.029
(0.022)

0.028
(0.022)

0.023
(0.027)

National Economic
Perceptions

-0.043
(0.028)

-0.039
(0.028)

-0.038
(0.028)

-0.042
(0.030)

Support for Democracy

0.030
(0.029)

0.034
(0.030)

0.034
(0.030)

0.028
(0.029)

Protest Activity

0.595***
(0.087)

0.603***
(0.091)

0.600***
(0.089)

0.608***
(0.097)
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Environment

0.118***
(0.039)

0.117***
(0.041)

0.120***
(0.040)

0.113***
(0.040)

Proximity to Extraction

--

--

--

0.017***
(0.006)

Country-Level Variables
Governance Quality *
-Social Engagement

--

0.286**
(0.112)

0.278**
(0.133)

Governance Quality

--

0.256***
(0.094)

0.184**
(0.090)

0.217**
(0.086)

GINI

--

0.049***
(0.012)

0.048***
(0.012)

0.053***
(0.013)

Population (ln)

--

0.084*
(0.048)

0.084*
(0.049)

0.066
(0.046)

GDP Growth

--

0.075**
(0.031)

0.077**
(0.031)

0.080***
(0.030)

Level 1 N
Level 2 N

15,736
18

15,003
17

15,003
17

13,167
17

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (Robust standard errors). Multilevel ordered logistic regression
models with random intercepts.
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Table 2: Predicted Probabilities of Likelihood to Protest over Resource Extraction by Levels of
Civic and Political Engagement
Levels of civic and
political engagement22
Low
High

Predicted Probabilities

Confidence Intervals

.1932
.2986

[.1607, .2257]
[.2567, .3406]

31

Figure 4: Predictive Margins of Protesting over Resource Extraction
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1

Eisenstadt and West (2017, 2019) is an important exception. Using individual-level survey

data, the authors find that individuals in Ecuador express environmental concern when they are
objectively vulnerable to environmental damage and when they live in areas in which extraction
has occurred or is debated.
2

Based on this imperative, as Arsel et al. (2016b) explain, “extraction needs to continue and

expand regardless of prevailing circumstances, with the state playing a leading role and capturing
a large share of the ensuing revenues.”
3

This is particularly common when there is competition between local subsistence agriculture

and the incoming extractive industry (Conde, 2016, p. 82).
4

Our discussion on the quality of governance builds on Barnes and Córdova (2016).

5

Political mediation theory suggests that the influence of movement collective action is

contingent on specific contexts.
6

The logic behind the quality of institutions translating into public assessments is partly based in

the theoretical models of Barnes and Córdova (2016) on support for gender quotas in Latin
America.
7

Moseley’s dependent variable comes from Vanderbilt’s LAPOP surveys. These surveys can be

found at: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/. Our study uses the Latinobarómetro data based in
Santiago, Chile. The Latinobarómeter can be found at: http://www.latinobarometro.org/
8

We test for this curvilinear effect through a robustness check incorporating quadratic forms of

our institutional variable (Governance Quality), but do not find statistically significant results.
This indicates a need for further exploration of this relationship in future studies, and the
uniqueness of protests around resource extraction as opposed to demonstrations around other
issues.
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9

See Felipe Iturrieta, “Escondida workers to end strike as they opt for the old contract,” Reuters

(March 3, 2017).
10

See “World’s biggest copper mine Escondida hit by workers strikes amid labor law reform,”

Deutsche Welle (February 15, 2017).
11

Unlike Chile, the mineral sector in Ecuador is less important. Mineral rents were 0.1 per cent

of the country’s GDP in 2014 (World Bank, 2016).
12

See “Texaco/Chevron lawsuits” (https://business-humanrights.org/en/texacochevron-lawsuits-

re-ecuador). Accessed November 11, 2017.
13
14

Since 1993, PetroEcuador is the sole owner of this project.
See Clifford Krauss, “Lawyer Who Beat Chevron in Ecuador Faces Trial of His Own,” The New

York Times (July 30, 2013). http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/31/business/steven-donzigerlawyer-who-beat-chevron-in-ecuador-faces-trial-of-his-own.html
15

The list of countries is as follows: Brazil (1,250 respondents); Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,

Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (1,200 respondents each
country); Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and
Panama (1,000 respondents each country). See Appendix for the descriptive statistics for all
variables in our models (Table 1), as well as the coding for these variables (Table 2).
16
17

See http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp for more details on the survey.
The operationalization of the dependent variable measures specifically a citizen’s likelihood to

protest extractive policies. As it does not aggregate all types of protests, our measure provides a
more accurate representation of a citizen’s decision-making calculus over resource extraction.
18

We recognize that our measure of social engagement based on social networks does not

capture the complexity of this concept. While our main analysis focuses on this variable, we also
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account for other social engagement variables such as civic participation and participation in
political campaigns (see Table 1). We view these variables as conceptually similar and use them
to capture the complexity of social engagement.
19

Appendix (Table 4) provides a detailed breakdown of the component parts of this index.

20

We also find that the total variance accounted for by the variance between countries

(Intraclass Correlation Coefficient, or ICC) is statistically significant (at the p<.001 level) and
equal to 3.48 percent. Previous works by Anderson and Singer (2008) and Barnes and Córdova
(2016) show that “in cross-national research the variation between countries depicted by the ICC
tends to be relatively small in studies that use survey data, because the number of cases at the
individual level is much larger than the number of cases at the country-level” (p. 14).
21

Additive had a Cronbach’s alpha reliability produced a value of .955, well about the standard

.7 suggested for creating additive indices.
22

The prediction is for a strong willingness to protest over resource extraction (measured as a

“10” on the Latinobarometer survey question). Levels of civic and political engagement are
based on the variables Social Engagement, Civic Participation, and Campaign Frequency. A low
level of civic and political engagement is based on a value of “0” for each of these variables,
with the remaining variables at their mean. A high level of civic and political engagement is
based on a value of “1” for each of these variables, with the remaining variables at their mean.
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Appendix. Summary Statistics and Variable Descriptions
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable
Governance Quality
Campaign Frequency
Civic Participation
Social Engagement
Population (ln)
Protest (Resource Extraction)
Sex
Age
Socioeconomic Status
Education (years)
Presidential Approval
Interpersonal Trust
Personal Economic
Perception
National Economic
Perception
Support for Democracy
GINI
Growth (annual)
Proximity to Extraction
Environment
Protest Activity
Social Media

Observations Mean

Minimum Maximum

20,250
19,565
20,250
20,250
20,250
19,500
20,250
20,250
19,653
20,250
18,768
19,789
20,143

Standard
Deviation
1.4055 .4806
1.3891 .7209
.2071
.4052
.2646
.4411
16.6360 1.1537
5.8643 3.3822
1.5159 .4998
40.3696 16.4929
2.3098 .9282
9.9063 4.5270
.5035
.5000
1.1730 .3782
3.1988 .7630

.7695
1
0
0
15.0485
1
1
16
1
1
0
1
1

2.3625
4
1
1
19.1523
10
2
98
5
17
1
2
5

20,097

2.8459

.9162

1

5

18,582
20,250
19,050
17,850
20,250
20,250
18,831

2.4537
43.6168
2.8267
.3745
.4275
.1186
2.2351

.7661
3.4925
2.3872
1.0828
.4947
.3233
1.2711

1
36.92
-3.8474
0
0
0
1

3
48.91
7.0409
18
1
1
4

1

Table 2. Latinobarómetro Survey Question Variable Descriptions
Variable
Protest

Social Engagement

Civic Participation

Personal Economic Perceptions

Description
‘On a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 means ‘not
at all’ and 10 ‘very’, how willing would you
be to demonstrate and protest about…?
 ‘Exploitation of natural resources’
10-point scale; higher values = greater
likelihood to protest.
‘With which of the following statements do
you agree most?’
 ‘Social networks allow you to
participate in politics’
 ‘Social networks create the illusion
that you are participating in politics’
 ‘Social networks are not suitable for
participate [sic] in politics’
 Do not know
 Did not answer
Scores were dichotomized and coded as 1 if
“Social networks allow you to participate in
politics,” 0 otherwise.
‘Which of the following things do you think a
person must do in order to be considered a
citizen?’ (Multiple responses allowed)
 ‘Vote in elections’
 ‘Pay taxes’
 ‘Always obey laws and regulations’
 ‘Participate in social organizations’
 ‘Participate in political organizations’
 ‘Choose products that are
environmentally responsible’
 ‘Help people in (country) who are
worse off than yourself’
 ‘Be willing to service in the military at
time of need’
 Do not know/did not answer
Scores were dichotomized and coded as 1 if
“Participate in social organizations” and
“Participate in political organizations” was
chosen, 0 otherwise.
‘In general, how would you describe your
present economic situation and that of your
family? Would you say it is…?’
1. Very bad
2

National Economic Perceptions

Campaign Frequency

Interpersonal Trust

Age
Gender
Presidential Approval
Support for Democracy

2. Bad
3. About average
4. Good
5. Very good
* These values have been inverted so that
higher values indicate a more positive view of
the economic situation than lower values.
5-point scale: higher values = more positive
view of personal economic situation.
‘In general, how would you describe the
country’s present economic situation? Would
you say it is…?’
1. Very bad
2. Bad
3. About average
4. Good
5. Very good
* These values have been inverted so that
higher values indicate a more positive view of
the economic situation than lower values.
5-point scale: higher values = more positive
view of country’s economic situation.
‘How frequently do you do each of the
following things? Very frequently, frequently,
almost never or never?’
 ‘Work for a political party or
candidate’
Coded as 1 for “Never,” 2 for “Almost
never,” 3 for “Frequently,” 4 for “Very
frequently.”
‘Generally speaking, would you say that you
can trust most people, or that you can never
be too careful when dealing with others?’
Coded as 1 if “One can never be too careful
when dealing with others,” 2 if “One can trust
most people”.
‘What is your age?’
Respondent’s age in years.
‘Gender of the interviewee’
Coded as 1 if “Male,” 2 if “Female.”
‘Do you approve or not the performance of
the government led by President (name)?’
Coded as 0 if “Disapprove,” 1 if “Approve”.
‘With which of the following statements do
you agree most?’
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Education (years)

Socioeconomic Status

Protest Activity

Environment

Answers were dichotomized and coded 1
if “Democracy is preferable to any other
kind of government,” 0 otherwise.
‘What level of education do you have?’
Without education (1); 1 year (2); 2 years
(3); 3 years (4); 4 years (5); 5 years (6); 6
years (7); 7 years (8); 8 years (9); 9 years
(10); 10 years (11); 11 years (12); 12
years (13); Incomplete university (14);
Completed university (15); High
school/academies/Incomplete technical
(16); High school/academies/Complete
technical (17)
‘People sometimes describe themselves as
belonging to a social class. Which social class
would you describe yourself as belonging
to…?’
1. Low
2. Lower-middle
3. Middle
4. Upper-middle
5. High
*This scale has been inversed so that higher
values indicate higher socioeconomic status.
5-point scale: higher values = higher
socioeconomic status.
‘I am going to read out a variety of political
activities that people can undertake and I
would like you to tell me, if you have ever
done any of them (1), if you would never do
any of them (2), or if you would never do any
of them (3).’
b. Attended an authorized demonstration
or protest march
c. Attended an unauthorized
demonstration, protest march, block
traffic
Protest Activity is coded (1) if answers to (b)
and (c) are 1 (“done any of them”), and 0
otherwise.
‘From the following list of topics, tell me
which are the most important for the
development of your country.’ (Multiple
responses allowed)
Environment
Infrastructure
4

Social Media

Institutions
Integration to the world
Social policies
None of the above
Do not know
Did not answer
Coded as 1 if respondent answered that the
environment was the most important issue, 0
otherwise.
‘Have you ever used e-mail or connected to
Internet?’
Yes, every day
Yes, occasionally
Yes, rarely
No, never
Do not know
Did not answer
Coded as 1 if “Yes, every day” or “Yes,
occasionally,” 0 otherwise.
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Table 3. Description of component variables in Governance Quality
Component Variable
Stability

Description
the extent to which policies are stable over
time
Adaptability
the extent to which policies are adjusted when
they fail or when circumstances change
Coherence and Coordination
the degree to which policies are consistent
with related policies, and result from wellcoordinated actions among the actors who
participate in their design and implementation
Quality of implementation and enforcement
the degree to which policies are implemented
and enforced properly after the approval in
Congress
Public-regardedness
the degree to which policies pursue the public
interest
Efficiency
the extent to which policies reflect an
allocation of scarce resources that ensures
high returns
Note: Language is borrowed from Scartascini & Tommasi (2014, p. 8).
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Robustness Checks
Table 4: Likelihood to Protest over Resource Extraction Controlling for Social Media
Model 1
Individual-Level Variables
Social Engagement

-0.174
(0.167)

Civic Participation

0.213***
(0.053)

Campaign Frequency

0.118***
(0.034)

Gender

-0.018
(0.035)

Age

-0.013***
(0.002)

Socioeconomic Status

0.011
(0.031)

Education (years)

0.011*
(0.006)

Presidential Approval

-0.037
(0.055)

Interpersonal Trust

-0.004
(0.074)

Personal Economic
Perceptions

0.036
(0.023)

National Economic
Perceptions

-0.052*
(0.027)

Support for Democracy

0.041
(0.031)

Environment

0.128***
(0.043)

Protest Activity

0.587***
(0.095)

Social Media

0.007
(0.017)
7

Country-Level Variables
Governance Quality *
Social Engagement

0.271**
(0.115)

Governance Quality

0.045***
(0.011)

GINI

0.121**
(0.053)

Population (ln)

0.087**
(0.035)

GDP Growth

0.045***
(0.011)

Level 1 N
Level 2 N

13,829
16

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (Robust standard errors).
Multilevel ordered logistic regression models with
random intercepts.
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Table 5: Multilevel Ordered Logistic Regression: Likelihood to Protest over Resource Extraction
with Alternative Operationalization of Governance Quality
Model 1
Additive *
Social
Engagement
Individual-Level Variables
Social Engagement
0.264***
(0.041)

Model 2
Rule of Law *
Social
Engagement

Model 3
Government
Effectiveness *
Social
Engagement

Model 4
Voice and
Accountability
* Social
Engagement

0.314***
(0.043)

0.282***
(0.039)

0.194***
(0.043)

Civic Participation

0.216***
(0.049)

0.216***
(0.049)

0.216***
(0.049)

0.215***
(0.049)

Campaign Frequency

0.126***
(0.032)

0.125***
(0.032)

0.126***
(0.032)

0.125***
(0.032)

Gender

-0.015
(0.033)

-0.016
(0.033)

-0.015
(0.033)

-0.014
(0.033)

Age

-0.013***
(0.002)

-0.013***
(0.002)

-0.013***
(0.002)

-0.013***
(0.002)

Socioeconomic Status

0.012
(0.028)

0.012
(0.028)

0.012
(0.028)

0.012
(0.028)

Education Years

0.013**
(0.005)

0.013**
(0.005)

0.013**
(0.005)

0.012**
(0.005)

Presidential Approval

-0.052
(0.052)

-0.053
(0.052)

-0.052
(0.052)

-0.052
(0.053)

Interpersonal Trust

0.013
(0.070)

0.014
(0.070)

0.013
(0.070)

0.014
(0.070)

Personal Economic
Perceptions

0.028
(0.022)

0.029
(0.022)

0.027
(0.023)

0.028
(0.022)

National Economic
Perceptions

-0.038
(0.028)

-0.039
(0.028)

-0.037
(0.029)

-0.038
(0.028)

Support for Democracy

0.035
(0.030)

0.035
(0.030)

0.035
(0.030)

0.035
(0.030)

Protest Activity

0.600***
(0.089)

0.600***
(0.090)

0.600***
(0.089)

0.601***
(0.089)

Environment

0.121***
(0.040)

0.119***
(0.040)

0.123***
(0.040)

0.119***
(0.040)

--

--

--

Country-Level Variables
Additive *
0.089***
Social Engagement (0.026)
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Additive *
Social Engagement

--

0.230***
(0.052)

--

--

Additive *
Social Engagement

--

--

0.277***
(0.081)

--

Additive *
Social Engagement

--

--

--

0.208**
(0.102)

Additive

0.033
(0.028)

--

--

--

Rule of Law

--

0.100
(0.070)

--

--

Government
Effectiveness

--

--

0.052
(0.078)

--

Voice and
Accountability

--

--

--

0.129
(0.099)

GINI

0.056***
(0.014)

0.051***
(0.015)

0.058***
(0.013)

0.060***
(0.013)

Population (ln)

0.080
(0.051)

0.093*
(0.055)

0.062
(0.048)

0.085*
(0.049)

GDP Growth

0.067**
(0.030)

0.072**
(0.031)

0.060**
(0.029)

0.067**
(0.031)

Level 1 N
Level 2 N

15,003
17

15,003
17

15,003
17

15,003
17

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (Robust standard errors). Multilevel ordered logistic regression
models with random intercepts.
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